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WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS


Week Ending December 30,1972

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SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS



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Enemy Activity

Enemy initiated activity in South Vietnam remained at a low level during the past week. The Communists seem cautious about taking the initiative in ground actions, although North Vietnamese units have continued to launch heavy defensive attacks by fire against South Vietnamese forces which are gradually expanding their perimeters in northern Quang Tri Province. Some evidence from enemy communications suggests that one of the NVA Divisions in Quang Tri Province — the 304th — may now be moving back north across the DMZ, and there are parallel indications that what may be another enemy division may be coming into the Quang Tri area to take the 304th's place. Elsewhere, the enemy's combat activity has been limited to small rocket and mortar attacks, and harassment of outposts and lines of communications. Some clandestine reporting, however, indicates that enemy forces are planning for an upsurge of activity in the next few weeks in an effort to influence the coming round of negotiations. ARVN forces should be able to contain any new enemy attacks, although the Communists may be capable of producing a few headline-producing spectaculars.

In Cambodia, enemy activity has also been at a low level. FANK has managed to enlarge its perimeter around encircled Kompong Thom, but has not been able to lift the siege of the city. Friendly convoys moving up the Mekong River into Phnom Penh have received some harassment, but no serious threat to their passage has been posed. At least for the moment, the Communists appear to be willing to engage in low level holding actions while refitting and resting their major units. Even when Communist forces are relatively quiescent, the FANK is not a major threat to the security of NVA units or to the NVA logistical system in Cambodia. No major change in the current situation appears imminent.

Government irregulars in north Laos continue to hold their positions at Bouam Long, the last friendly enclave north of the Plaine des Jarres, in the face of a fairly heavy enemy attack which began on 26 December. Elsewhere in the north, enemy forces consisting mostly of Deuanist neutralist elements have captured Sala Phou Khoun, an important road junction on Route 13, the only overland route between Vientiane and the Royal Capital at Luang Prabang. In southern Laos, friendly forces have recovered a major highway bridge captured and held by the enemy for a week, but government troops operating around the central Panhandle town of Muong Phalane were forced to give up some of their positions under heavy enemy rocket and artillery fire. Heavy enemy attacks were also sustained by irregular battalions at Saravane. On the Bolovens Plateau friendly forces still control Paksong and the surrounding terrain. Northeast of Paksong, friendly patrols have found and destroyed several significant enemy supply caches.

Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

During the week 1,544 NVA personnel were detected in the infiltration pipeline. This brings the estimated number of infiltrators detected moving southward to South Vietnam and Cambodia since 1 October 1972 to some 28,100 - 29,600.

On the logistics side, intercepted messages indicate that the North Vietnamese moved some 1,200 tons of materiel (mainly ordnance and foodstuffs) southward through the Vinh area during the week. This is about half the amount that transited Vinh during the previous week. The sharp reduction in the supply flow may be a reflection of the intense aerial bombardment of transportation networks in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas through which supplies coming overland from China must pass on their way south. The southward movement of NVA armor elements from the Vinh area, which we noted last week, is apparently continuing. At least 11 tanks were mentioned in newly intercepted communications, but there is no clear indication of their subordination, and they may belong to a suspect armored group previously detected in that area.

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